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Abstract:  This commentary on Zentall’s target article focuses primarily on clarifying some 
postulates and variables in cognitive dissonance theory. I discuss the adaptive motivational 
functions of dissonance arousal and dissonance reduction, and attempt to clarify some past 
dissonance experiments and to tease apart a dissonance theory and contrast explanation of 
effort-justification-type effects. The evidence and arguments reviewed here support the 
explanatory power of cognitive dissonance theory in a wide variety of circumstances in 
human and nonhuman animals, but they depend on first defining concepts such as 
“cognitions” quite broadly, as Festinger did when he originally proposed the theory. 
 
 
Eddie Harmon-Jones, Professor of 
Psychology, The University of New South 
Wales, studies the effects of emotions on 
attention and other cognitive processes, 
the role of emotion and motivation in 
aggressive and pro-social behaviour, and 
the antecedents and consequences of 
discrepancies between cognitions 




In a very thought-provoking target article, Zentall (2016) reviews the results of several clever 
experiments that are consistent with effort-justification effects obtained from research on 
cognitive dissonance theory. However, Zentall presents the case that the results may be 
better explained by a contrast effect. He also reviews several exciting new results from 
experiments suggesting that the anticipation of unpleasant effort could cause increased 
reward valuation. The target article also includes a very interesting discussion on “out of 
sight, out of mind” that has not been fully investigated in humans by dissonance 
researchers. I suspect that this target article will inspire much new research. 
In this commentary, I will offer a few observations on Zentall’s target article. I will 
focus primarily on clarifying some postulates and variables in cognitive dissonance theory, 
and will then discuss the adaptive motivational functions of dissonance arousal and 
dissonance reduction. I will also discuss dissonance processes in nonhuman animals and 
attempt to clarify some past dissonance experiments. I will finish by discussing how one 
might tease apart a dissonance theory and contrast explanation of effort-justification-type 
effects. 
 
Clarifications of Postulates and Variables in Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
 
Cognitive dissonance theory is concerned with relationships between cognitions. The term 
“cognitions” is defined broadly to include almost any knowledge about oneself or the 




environment (Festinger, 1957, pp. 9-11). The theory did not propose that "conflict between 
beliefs" was "the primary responsible mechanism" [Zentall, Introduction, para. 2]. 
Moreover, the dissonance-theoretic explanation of the effort-justification paradigm is not 
consistent with the statement by Zentall that "pigeons experienced conflict between their 
beliefs (the law of least effort) and their behavior (they worked harder on some trials than 
on others to obtain the same reward)" [The Within-Trial Contrast Effect, para. 4]. 
Mills (Aronson & Mills, 1959), who conducted the first effort-justification 
experiment, explained quite precisely why effort should evoke dissonance. He wrote:  
 
“Dissonance is aroused whenever a person engages in an unpleasant activity to 
obtain some desirable outcome. From the cognition that the activity is unpleasant, it 
follows that one would not engage in the activity; the cognition that the activity is 
unpleasant is dissonant with engaging in the activity. Dissonance should be greater, 
the greater the unpleasant effort required to obtain the outcome.” (Harmon-Jones & 
Mills, 1999, p. 7) 
 
The conflict is between the knowledge that the activity is unpleasant and the knowledge 
that one has engaged in that activity. Hence any unpleasant features of the behavior should 
evoke dissonance and explain the results accounted for by contrast. Another key part of 
Mills’s (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999) explanation is the idea that the effort is “required to 
obtain the outcome” (p. 7), a point to which I return later in this commentary.  
 
The Motivational Functions of Dissonance Arousal and Dissonance Reduction 
 
Zentall writes, “Although the resolution of cognitive dissonance may make us feel better, it 
can be detrimental to our health and can in many cases encourage us to behave 
inappropriately” [Introduction, para. 1]. Festinger (1957) did not discuss whether 
dissonance and its reduction were associated with negative or positive consequences. 
However, other dissonance theorists have concurred with Zentall and speculated that 
dissonance processes were primarily associated with negative consequences and were 
maladaptive (Aronson, 1995).  
In contrast, according to the action-based version of dissonance (Harmon-Jones, 
1999; Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & 
Levy, 2015), dissonance processes may serve adaptive functions (although of course, 
adaptive mechanisms may occasionally cause harm as well). The model begins by positing 
that cognition is for action; that is, one of the most important functions of cognition is to 
guide behavior. Inconsistent information (cognitions) causes dissonance because it has the 
potential to interfere with action. The affective state of dissonance signals that there is a 
conflict between action tendencies and that the “cognitive inconsistency” needs to be 
addressed, so that behavior can occur. My colleagues and I have conducted a number of 
experiments testing hypotheses derived from this model (e.g., Harmon-Jones, Gerdjikov, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, 
Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Serra, & Gable, 2011; 
Harmon-Jones, Peterson, & Vaughn, 2003; Harmon-Jones, Price, & Harmon-Jones, 2015; 
Harmon-Jones, Schmeichel, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2011). 
 





Dissonance Processes in Nonhuman Animals and Clarifying Past Dissonance Experiments 
 
Zentall’s research suggests that something like dissonance processes may occur in 
nonhuman animals. Similarly, Lawrence and Festinger (1962) reported 16 experiments 
providing evidence suggestive of dissonance reduction in laboratory rats. More recent 
experiments have revealed that dissonance reduction may occur in capuchin monkeys 
(Egan, Santos, & Blooom, 2007). Zentall discusses the latter research and then dismisses it 
based on the critical work by Chen and Risen (2010).  
Egan, Bloom, and Santos (2010) have since addressed the criticisms of Chen and 
Risen (2010) by using a “blind choice” paradigm. They found spreading of alternatives after 
their subjects (capuchin monkeys or preschool children) made a choice between two hidden 
objects. Thus, the attitude change could not be explained by “revealed preferences.” 
Several other studies have also addressed these earlier criticisms (see review by Kitayama, 
Tompson, & Chua, 2014).  
Zentall also provides a “contrast” reinterpretation of the classic experiment by 
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). In that experiment, participants were paid $1 or $20 to tell a 
subsequent “participant” that the boring task they had just completed was in fact 
interesting. From dissonance theory, the dollars paid represented the number of cognitions 
consonant with engaging in the counter-attitudinal behavior (i.e., telling the next participant 
that the task was interesting). Most conceptual replications of this experiment 
operationalized the number of consonant cognitions with a manipulation of perceived 
choice: Participants who were led to believe that they were freely choosing to engage in 
counter-attitudinal behavior changed their attitudes to make them more consistent with the 
behavior than did participants who were led to believe they were “forced” to engage in the 
same behavior (i.e., having been repeatedly told that they were randomly assigned to make 
the counter-attitudinal statement). These experiments assumed that perceiving oneself as 
having freely chosen to engage in counter-attitudinal behavior would provide fewer 
cognitions consonant with the behavior than perceiving oneself as having been forced by 
the researcher to engage in the same behavior. It is not clear how a contrast explanation 
would handle these perceived choice experiments, which form the bulk of research on 
dissonance theory. 
 
Teasing Apart the Dissonance and Contrast Explanations of Effort Justification 
 
The difference between the two conceptual explanations – cognitive dissonance reduction 
versus contrast effect – could be teased apart by manipulating whether there is an 
association between the unpleasant effort and the reward. A contrast explanation would 
seem to predict that the association would not matter, whereas a dissonance explanation 
would seem to predict that the association would matter (see the earlier quotation from 
Mills). That is, according to dissonance theory, the reward should be associated with the 
unpleasant effort in order to "justify" the effort. If the reward is merely presented closely in 
time/space to the unpleasant effort and is explicitly described as not being associated with 
the effort, then increased reward valuation would not be predicted by dissonance theory 
but would be predicted by a contrast-effect perspective. It may be the case that nonhuman 
animals often and adult humans occasionally assume implicitly that the reward is associated 
with the effort. Consequently, it may be difficult to test this idea in nonhuman animals if 




they often/always assume that the reward is linked to their own effort. With adult humans, 
a researcher can explicitly inform them that the reward is not linked to the effort and can 
thus test these competing predictions.  
Research by Gerard and Mathewson (1966) has already provided one of these tests, 
and it has supported a dissonance-theoretic explanation over a contrast explanation. In this 
experiment, participants received electric shocks in order to be initiated into a group 
(initiates condition) or they received electric shocks as part of a study (non-initiate 
condition). Within each of these conditions, half the participants received intense shocks 
and half received mild shocks. This experiment used the amount of suffering of physical pain 
as the manipulation of the intensity of unpleasant effort. After participants received the 
shocks, they heard and then rated a boring group discussion. Participants in the “initiates” 
condition were led to believe that this was a recording of a previous meeting of the group 
that they were about to join, whereas participants in the “non-initiates” condition simply 
evaluated the group. Participants who experienced the intense (effortful) shocks evaluated 
the group more positively than participants who experienced the mild shocks. However, this 
effort-justification effect occurred only when participants were led to believe that they were 
receiving the shocks in order to gain access to the group (gain a reward). When participants 
believed they were receiving the shocks as part of a psychological experiment (the non-
initiate condition), those who received the intense shocks evaluated the group more 
negatively than those who received the mild shocks. Thus, the typical effect of shock 
intensity on the evaluation of the group (i.e., the effort-justification effect) was reversed 
when participants believed their effort did not lead to admission into the group (the 
reward), a result that is the opposite of what would be predicted by a contrast effect.  
Another line of inquiry, however, predicts a relationship between effort and reward 
valuation opposite to the one suggested by both dissonance theory and the contrast effect: 
Theories of decision making (see Kivetz, 2003; Walton, Kennerley, Bannerman, Phillips, & 
Rushworth, 2006) and social theories of equity (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) 
suggest that greater effort should lead to reward devaluation. These theories view effort as 
a negative value or as a cost. A reward is perceived as less valuable if it is difficult to obtain 
than if it is easy to obtain because its benefits are offset by its costs. This principle has been 
referred to as effort discounting.  
In an experiment by Botvinick et al. (2009) two types of task-switching blocks 
(counterbalanced) were presented to participants: low versus high effort. After each block, 
participants were shown a screen that indicated whether or not they had earned a dollar ($ 
or X), and neural activity in response to this indicator was measured. High-effort blocks with 
(dollar) rewards caused the least nucleus accumbens activity, which was interpreted to 
indicate low-reward valuation. Participants had been explicitly informed that the amount 
they would earn would be equal for high- and low-effort blocks, and would not depend on 
their speed or accuracy. This methodology differs from dissonance experiments on the 
effects of effort justification, which do not inform participants that the reward is equal in 
high- versus low-effort conditions. 
Why would these different sets of theories and bodies of research lead to opposite 
predictions and results? I believe the unrecognized difference between these two 
perspectives is that the experimental designs used for the two perspectives differ in terms 
of perceived psychological control over obtaining the reward. That is, in dissonance and 
Zentall’s contrast experiments, individuals perceive an association between their effort and 
receiving the reward, whereas in the effort-discounting studies (and in Gerard and 




Mathewson’s contrast conditions), individuals do not (in fact they are explicitly informed 
that there is no association between their effort and receiving the reward). The belief that 
unpleasant effort was necessary to obtain the reward may be an important factor in 
producing effort justification rather than effort discounting.  
The contrast perspective suggests that undergoing any unpleasant experience will 
make subsequent experiences (rewards) more positive by comparison. Dissonance theory, 
however, would counter that individuals are only motivated to perceive a subsequent 
experience more positively when the subsequent event is causally connected to the 
unpleasant effort. That is, effort justification only occurs when individuals believe they have 
exerted the effort in order to obtain the reward.  
The results of the experiment by Gerard and Mathewson (1966) were inconsistent 
with a contrast effect interpretation but consistent with cognitive dissonance theory. When 
participants underwent shocks and were informed that these were unrelated to 
subsequently being allowed to join a group, they evaluated the group more negatively (not 
more positively as a contrast effect would predict). These findings, taken together with the 
results obtained on effort discounting, suggest that cognitive dissonance theory is a better 
explanation of responses to unpleasant effort than a contrast explanation. An association 
between effort and reward may often be assumed in nonhuman animals and in humans. (“I 
worked hard and I am receiving this reward as a result of my work.”) However, when that 
association is explicitly and heavy-handedly broken by a researcher, individuals seem to 





Taken together, the evidence and arguments reviewed here support the explanatory power 
of cognitive dissonance theory in a wide variety of circumstances, in both human and 
nonhuman animals. However, this requires us to define concepts such as “cognitions” quite 
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